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ABSTRACT 
 
Sustainable management of natural resources in small scale agriculture is a less debated issue, especially 
its governance aspects. Focusing on selected villages where a policy towards sustainable agriculture has 
been introduced in Karnataka - a state showing signs of agrarian distress; the paper discusses the 
governance aspects in natural resources management for small scale farming. Based on focused group 
discussions with farmers, officials and voluntary workers, the study indicates benefits for small farmers 
and less developed districts from the emerging policy trend towards sustainable agriculture. We also elicit 
governance factors responsible for outcomes of such policies. Inclusive design and participatory 
governance emerge crucial along with efficacy of government officials and completeness in 
implementation. 
Keywords: Natural resources management, Small scale farming. 
JEL: Q28, Q010, Q13 
 
I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Analysing policies and institutions for inclusive governance is increasingly 
becoming relevant to natural resource management (NRM) in India -  notably since 
the 1980s when joint forest management was pursued seriously; till recent times 
when rights of forest dwelling communities were enacted [Schedule Tribes and other 
Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006 (FRA)].1 The recent 
discourse on governance in NRM spans varied approaches: (a) centralised and top-
down  mechanisms  for regulation and conflict redressal (e.g., National Green 
Tribunal 2010),2 (b) community based but externally supported management regimes 
(e.g., water users’ associations, collectives around low external input sustainable 
agriculture),3 (c) self- organised regimes at the grass roots  (e.g., sacred groves of 
Western Ghats), (Chandrashekara and Sankar, 1998), (d) co-management schemes 
(e.g., committees at different levels under FRA) and (e) multi-tier and polycentric 
governance (e.g., case of fisheries as in Ostrom and Cox (2010), institutional 
mechanisms envisaged under FRA and in the National Authority/State Boards for 
Biodiversity in India). 
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Institutional studies do not prescribe specific analytical methods for looking at 
governance, but provide overall principles, as any framework and specific method 
need to be context-dependent and adaptive; attributable to the ever more complex 
interaction of ecosystems, institutions, policies, technologies, actors and values. 
Nevertheless, there are arguments for analysing the policy implementation processes 
in the context of clusters of actors and organisations (Sabatier, 1991); while empirical 
studies (e.g. Nagendra and Ostrom, 2012) show that polycentric engagements enable 
users to evolve rules and organisations at multiple levels. Unlike the governance 
issues in the context of forest resources (Murali et al., 2006; Behera and Engel, 
2006), applied research on institutions and governance regimes in production systems 
especially at regional and local levels are rare (e.g. Vorley, 2002). This lacuna looks 
pronounced considering; (a) the ambitious expectation of feeding more than three 
billion people from a shrinking natural resource base in the next four decades, (b) the 
rapid pace of change that the sector has undergone since  1960s in terms of 
technology, practices and socio-economic status of farmers across developing 
countries.   
In the above context of lack of attention to NRM institutions in today’s 
agriculture and a widespread concern about threatened natural resource base for 
farming (see Bhattacharya et al., 2004 for the extent of land degradation in India) this 
paper discusses a potential structure for policy and governance of NRM in 
agriculture.  First it takes a look at the modalities and potential outcomes (with 
respect to small scale agriculture) of an apparent transition towards sustainability 
objectives in agricultural policies. The next section analyses the case study in this 
larger context of transition while Section III identifies policy conflicts in agriculture. 
Section IV identifies governance, institutions and policies related to NRM in the 
agricultural context of Karnataka state in South-western India. This is followed by 
two sections that brief about study sites and methods adopted for analysing the 
governance in the background of a selected policy. Section VII discusses the role of 
governance in implementing the selected policy in small farmers’ perspective, 
drawing final conclusions in the last section. 
 
II 
 
CONTEXT 
 
Institutions in the form of law, policy or procedure; or as informal norms, 
standard operating practices or habits (Vatn, 2007), have recognised the potential to 
either facilitate or hinder development (Vorley, 2002). Institutions and governance 
mechanisms often overlap and work in tandem to attain policy objectives (Annan, 
1998).  That makes governance an important criterion while assessing the impact of 
policies through efficacy of institutional mechanisms that they set in motion; going 
beyond a stock taking against targets in financial achievements, number of 
beneficiaries or adoption rate. Institutional mechanisms and societal worldviews 
reshape each other being both dynamic and complementary. The analysis of 
INDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 242
developmental governance and policies thus help evolution of governance regime/s 
dealing with environmental and social issues. To quote from Vatn (2007), “the idea 
that there is only one institutional structure that is really the best solution to any 
problem, and that other solutions are used only because we fall short of realizing that 
ideal solution, is a great obstacle against both realism and creativity when the 
development of regimes is at stake”. We see this concern reflected in the governance 
and institutions in Indian agricultural scene. 
In the evolutionary context of a small holder dominated agricultural scene in 
India, intensive use of external inputs has been institutionalised over the past few 
decades. A mismatch between the technologies promoted by the government vis-à-vis 
the requirements of a large section of small farm holdings in India is evident in both 
data and literature on agricultural performance. The explicit focus of government 
executives as well as researchers and agencies generally rests on statistics like crop 
yield (and income) per unit land or labour,  fertiliser or pesticide consumption per 
unit area etc. (e.g., Government of India, 2009; Mathur et al., 2006; Misra and 
Govinda Rao, 2003) than information like preferences of farm families, the number 
of farmers who joined or abandoned the profession, how change in policies affect 
practices and farm families, trends in distress across varying agricultural governance 
regimes etc. This is despite the fact that, Department of Agriculture is the most 
visible public line agency in India that is decentralised in many ways (see Vaddiraju 
and Sangita, 2011; Shivanna, 2001). Decisions made by the farmers in managing 
their resources and short or long term productivity could be driven by the institutions 
that are active in the sector, while these institutions themselves continue to be driven 
by government policies - mainly those from the Department of Agriculture.  
Despite increased food production with the advent of Green Revolution, for the 
past 15 years India has been a net importer of agricultural food commodities (Ng and 
Aksoy, 2008).  The problems of shrinking size of holdings, expansion of commercial 
crops (and non-profitability of traditional crops), increasing indebtedness and 
vulnerability to the market forces are visible in Indian agriculture (Nadkarni, 1986, 
Ram et al., 1999, Misra and Govinda Rao, 2003). Growth in agricultural output has 
been slowing since 1990s (Fan and Chan-Kang, 2005) putting serious pressure on the 
income and livelihood of smallholders (Chand et al., 2011), while continuing to 
trigger and intensify ecological impacts including shrinking forest cover, loss of 
agricultural biodiversity, depleting ground water levels and contamination of water 
bodies (Matson et al., 1997; Singh, 2000). Policy responses to mitigate the above 
mentioned diverse problems in agriculture have typically been in the same direction 
for a long time - subsidies for seeds, fertilisers, power, irrigation, credit, loan waivers 
or relief packages and investment in agricultural research as well as technology 
extension. Informed governance strategies taking into account the multi-functionality 
of agrarian land use and trade-offs between various ecosystem services from them are 
still conspicuous by absence in these policy responses. 
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III 
 
STATE, CENTRE AND POLICIES FOR AGRICULTURAL NRM 
 
The agrarian situation in the south-western state of Karnataka is reflective of the 
rest of the country. The share of agriculture (only crop cultivation excluding allied 
activities like forestry, livestock, poultry etc.) in GSDP of Karnataka declined from 
11.9 per cent in 2007-08 to 5.9 per cent in 2010-11 (Government of Karnataka, 2010-
11), while 70 per cent of its population continued to depend on agriculture for 
livelihood. From 1960s till 1990s, agriculture in the state was intensively practiced 
with more land under commercial crops than food crops, while during the last two 
decades it witnessed significant shift in acreage from commercial non-food crops to 
horticultural crops (Purushothaman and Kashyap, 2010). These changes in the 
cropping pattern have had implications on farm practices including type and quantity 
of inputs used (see Pingali, 1997, for Asia in general). The sectoral problems are 
manifested in declining public investment in agriculture, shrinking farm size and 
persisting farmers’ suicides (Deshpande and Prachitha, 2005). In order to ease the 
crisis, the state government introduced various policy measures that included 
measures to encourage efficient natural resource management with emphasis on 
balancing ecological and livelihood dimensions of farming. As these measures 
deviate from the conventional productivity oriented schemes like subsidies for 
imported technologies; they also needed unconventional mechanisms for 
implementation. The governance pattern adopted by the state for such policies is 
traced below. 
Since ‘agriculture’ as well as ‘land use and planning’ are both state subjects (the 
central government has less direct control over planning and execution), individual 
states are responsible in principle, for the conservation, development and 
management of land and agricultural resources. This however is not manifested in the 
planning and fund allocation for different farm sector programmes on the ground, as 
the central policies of procurement prices and technology missions (for specific 
crops, driven by inflationary tendencies) drive crop selection, though state 
departments are free to plan, strategise and decentralise their mandates to lower levels 
of administration. Most states have established agencies to plan and implement 
various NRM programmes in watersheds and wastelands with financial and technical 
support from national or international agencies in the government or non-
governmental sectors. Apart from these schemes with potential direct impact on 
agricultural resources, there are various policies at different scales and sectors that 
impact the agricultural socio-ecological system (Purushothaman et al., 2012a). 
Although this means a diverse set of institutions and actors impacting NRM in 
agriculture, the key players determining the outcome of farm policies are the 
Government of Karnataka, Government of India, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) active in the agricultural sector and the farming community. Agricultural 
NRM in Karnataka is shaped by the way any/all of these institutions interact and 
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form a self-reinforcing loop. Although the scale and sectoral dimensions of different 
policies and institutions interplay with each other towards the actual outcome, the 
Department of Agriculture (both at the centre and the state) act as the key nodal actor 
for any policy. Most common instruments employed by this nodal department are 
subsidies, direct payments, outreach and contact programmes.   
 Generally the relative quantum and direction of incentives as subsidies vary 
between explicit and implicit instruments (Acharya and Jogi, 2004). Explicit input 
subsidies are payments made by the government to the farmers (or to the agents who 
supply the inputs) to meet the cost of an input. Instead, with an implicit subsidy, input 
prices are administratively determined especially if cost of production of the input is 
much more than its market price. This invisible subsidy supports industrial producers 
of chemical fertilisers. We consider the implicit subsidy to chemical fertilisers as 
‘institutionalised mainstream incentive’ as considerable public interest and 
government expenditure are involved (Fan et al., 2008).4 These remain true while 
budget allocations in other directions especially towards NRM policies, like National 
and Regional Centres of Organic Farming5 remain relatively marginal. 
Nascent attempts to support sustainable farming by the Karnataka State 
Department of Agriculture provide an example of potential NRM strategies with 
better financial commitments from the state government. For instance, introduction 
and implementation of targeted agricultural schemes like State Organic Farming 
Mission, Karnataka State Policy on Organic Farming (KSPOF) and NRM 
components in various technology and crop specific missions. The stated objectives 
of such policies are both ecological and socio-economic, aiming at ensuring and 
sustaining food and nutritional security and soil fertility, as well as avoiding 
indebtedness.  
Thus in a nutshell, when the state department is beginning to invest in promoting 
sustainable practices and optimum use of natural bio-mass in small farms, the central 
policies (and corresponding mechanisms in the states) pull in the opposite direction, 
with incentives to procure implicitly subsidised chemical inputs. Generally 
influenced by industries and politically powerful large farmers, these opposite forces 
could have a dampening effect on the outcome of state policies towards sustainable 
agriculture. It appears that while sustained productivity of land is a local concern, 
increasing food production and lowering food prices is priority for a federal authority. 
Thus through decentralised institutions and polices, NRM in primary production 
landscapes is a suitable approach to accomplish the mandate of local developmental 
action. However, it needs to act against conflicting centralised policies and lobbies 
for industrial inputs.  
These recent agricultural policies in transition towards a focus on sustainability, 
originate mainly with state government as a mixed bag of financial, technological and 
social interface between target groups and local implementing agencies. They can 
potentially affect a range of stakeholders (Purushothaman et al., 2012b) positively 
and  negatively,  with  varying  magnitude.  The hub  of impacts (Figure 1) developed  
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Figure 1. Impact Hub for a Farm Policy Reform 
 
during the study from various interactions (process of interactions described in 
Section VI) depicts institutions, individuals and agencies that are affected (both 
positively and negatively). The most affected are placed closer to the core and the 
positively impacted are placed on the left side. Only individuals and corporates 
dealing in manufacture and supply of chemical fertilisers could be affected adversely 
that too only in financial terms, as they also would benefit from healthy farm 
products. On the other hand, a host of organisations and individuals get benefitted 
from expansion of sustainable agricultural practices.  
 
IV 
 
GOVERNANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES FOR AGRICULTURAL NRM IN KARNATAKA 
 
The above mentioned transition in the focus of farm policy manifests itself both 
in terms of policy content and method of implementation, apart from increasing 
budgetary allocation. Budgetary support allocated for subsidies for organic inputs 
across various schemes increased by nearly 20 per cent in Karnataka in the period of 
four years from 2006 to 2010.6 The budget outlay for all schemes under policies on 
organic  farming  increased  from  ` 7 crores  in  2006  to  ` 120 crores  in  2010  and 
to ` 200 crores in 2011.7 Given the societal objectives outlined in the policy 
statement and the apparent spatial and budgetary expansions in this direction, amidst 
the crisis looming large in the sector, institutional mechanisms needed for successful 
implementation of such policies appear to be insufficiently deliberated. The 
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definition, context and implementation of such policies evoke interest also because 
the history of policy formulation involves formal recognition of certain failures in 
green revolution strategies. A third reason why these issues deserve attention is the 
low-key central support for such policies (compared to what is available for industrial 
scale synthetic inputs) making it a case to be analysed for potential strategisation of a 
socio-ecologically progressive policy change at sub-national scale. 
Karnataka State Policy on Organic Farming (KSPOF)8 was formulated in 2004 as 
the first policy in this direction in Karnataka and introduced to address the crisis in 
small scale farming. Since 2006, the number of farmers registered under the organic 
farming policy has grown five-fold. The official off-shoot of the popularity of this 
policy (and others with some support for organic inputs) is another initiative by the 
subsequent government in 2008 - the ‘Karnataka State Organic Farming Mission’ 
with considerable budgetary allocation aiming at reducing indiscriminate use of 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides and to provide healthy food to the people. The 
most ambitious and far-reaching objective of the above two policies (though currently 
there are changes on the anvil as discussed in the media) with varying governance 
mechanisms is to revive the rural economy that is intricately linked to agriculture, by 
offering rural youth an alternative to migrate to cities.  
 
Karnataka State Policy on Organic Farming (The ‘Organic Village’ Scheme) 
 
Given the above broad picture of policies and institutions around NRM in 
agriculture, in order to inquire into the governance concerns raised in Section II, we 
focus on the state policy on organic farming in Karnataka (KSPOF) as an example of 
a policy towards sustainable agriculture. Though small in the initial budget allocation 
(` 7 crore in 2006), KSPOF provides a clear deviation from the conventional 
dependence on high tech inputs, technology or practice and offers more than 
tokenism to small holders. In the background of increasing cost of cultivation, 
shrinking size of land holding, persistence of rainfed farming, soil degradation and 
trends in corporatisation making agriculture an unequal game for the small holder, it 
advocates reduction of market dependence for most of the inputs, improvement in 
farmers' income through improving quality of produce, and increase in rural 
employment opportunities. The policy was implemented initially in one selected 
village each in all districts of the state and later (in 2006) it was scaled up to one 
village per taluk. 
The incentives formulated in 2004 for organic manures and pesticides continue to 
be distributed to farmers, and partnering NGOs are being supported for training and 
guidance offered to the farmers, while new schemes are also emerging with similar 
incentives (e.g. National/State Horticultural Mission; Regional Centres on Organic 
Farming). The policy does not advocate immediate and complete conversion to 
certified organic farming, but intends to provide support (technical, financial and 
networking) for those who want it. The process of implementation of KSPOF entailed 
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that the Department of Agriculture select a partner NGO and a village in each 
selected taluk. Generally the NGO is selected based on its experience in the 
agricultural sector and local acceptance. Next, the government department together 
with the NGO choose a village to implement schemes under the policy in accordance 
with several factors – farmers’ interest in organic practices and livestock rearing, 
number of households, crops grown etc.  
In line with the argument that organic practices in the current agricultural scene 
are knowledge-based (Das, 2007), appropriate management practices were supposed 
to be developed under the policy and improved constantly, depending on locally 
available and most relevant inputs for local crops. For this to happen, convincing a 
conventional farmer on the benefit of moving to and sticking with the practices, as 
well as evolving techniques constantly, were crucial.  This was the expected role of 
NGOs – to be instrumental in organising trainings and interactive sessions, exposure 
visits, and in providing help and advice available in the village for implementing 
various components of the policy – vermicompost, azolla culture, mulching, organic 
pesticides, livestock keeping for manure, local crop varieties and so on. Partnering 
NGOs were also instrumental in generating socio-economic and agricultural 
benchmark data for the 176 villages selected for the policy. 
 Given the bulky quantum and wet storage needed for organic inputs, production 
and distribution of these inputs need to be in areas proximate to farms. For 
incentivising the production and distribution of this kind, grassroots agencies and 
local governments are best equipped. It is recognised that the kind(s), quantum, time 
and method of application of organic inputs as well as ways to produce the most 
locally appropriate inputs envisage constant research and field level interactions. 
Thus KSPOF put in place new governance and implementation mechanisms 
involving diverse agencies engaged in horticulture, watersheds, sericulture, 
education, animal husbandry, fisheries, marketing, co-operatives and the agricultural 
universities as well. Like other government schemes, KSPOF too is not free from 
problems including reported bias in selecting villages and partner NGOs as well as 
other irregularities. But as mentioned earlier, the study is not about the performance 
of the policy per se, but about its governance mechanism to take a look at the role 
that governance and institutions can play towards the outcomes of NRM polices in 
agriculture.  
As mentioned earlier, KSPOF (henceforth referred as ‘the policy’) was unique; in 
its origins, (originating from the state and not from the centre),9 with respect to the 
objectives (of diverting from the mainstream bipolar policies supporting either 
chemical or 100 per cent certified organic farming) and governance strategies 
(involving voluntary agencies and locally adaptive techniques). Unlike KSPOF, that 
had formal involvement of local NGOs, the organic farming mission that emerged 
later, focused on facilitating organic farmers’ associations without involving 
grassroot NGOs. 
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In terms of continuity of the practices popularised by the policy as well as 
awareness on the benefits and the schemes under the policy, the paper will now look 
at the success and failures of KSPOF with its multi-agency governance mechanism, 
based on a detailed assessment during 2009-10 in selected study areas. 
 
V 
 
SELECTED STUDY AREAS 
 
We conducted the study in the same sites chosen for an assessment of multi 
dimensional impact of organic farming policies (Purushothaman et al., 2012c).  The 
selected districts10 for the study (Figure 2) are located in different agro-climatic zones 
having different environmental, economic as well as societal characteristics (Table 1). 
Bijapur is the largest but least developed while Udupi the smallest and the most 
developed among the five study districts.  Chikballapur has the smallest holdings and 
Mysore has the highest density of population while Chitradurga topped in famers’ 
suicides during the period compared. Thus, out of the 176 villages where the organic 
farming policy was being implemented, 14 villages (across five selected districts) 
were finally under scrutiny for this study.  
 
Figure 2. Study Sites in Karnataka 
 
Table 2 summarises the temporal changes in land use and cropping pattern in the 
selected districts. Most of them show an expansion of agriculture, substituting other 
land uses and change in crops away from millets and pulses. The trends indicate 
possible signs of location-specific specialisation in crops during liberalisation period 
(post-1990s) in tandem with technology missions for selected crops that significantly 
correlate with the argument on institutionalised intensive cultivation of commercial 
crops.  With  expansion  of  irrigation,  sugarcane  cultivation  expanded  in  two 
districts.  Other  factors  like  market  access,  good  demand,  subsidised  seeds  and 
credit  availability  also  influenced  cultivation  of   certain   crops.   The   studies   of  
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TABLE 1. SELECTED FEATURES OF STUDY DISTRICTS 
 
(1) 
Bijapur 
(2) 
Chitradurga 
(3) 
Chikballapur 
(4) 
Mysore 
(5) 
Udupi 
(6) 
Geographical area a  (ha) 1053,471 770,702 404,501 676,382 356,446 
Average size of operational land  
   holding a (2005-06) (ha) 
3.03 2.05 1.15e 0.97 0.78 
Net sown area b   
   (2008-09) (per cent) 71 51 26 49 26 
Net irrigated area b  
   (2008-09) (per cent) 35 19 25 47 33 
Fertilisers distributed b (N+P+K, 
   kg/acre of net sown area) (2009-10) 92 72 221 229 69 
Population density c  (2011) (per km2) 207 197 298 437 304 
Farmers’ suicides d   (2003-07) 408 1058 241e 383 192 
No. of farm holdings b  (2006-07) 319,689 282,375 417,815e 371,042 197,401 
Notes:  aDirectorate of Economics and Statistics; bDepartment of Agriculture, Government of Karnataka; 
cCensus of India 2011; dState Crime Records Bureau, Government of Karnataka; eCombined for Kolar and 
Chikballapur. 
 
TABLE 2. CHANGE IN LAND USE AND CROPPING PATTERN IN THE STUDY DISTRICTS 
(IN DECREASING ORDER OF ACREAGE) 
 
 
(1) 
Bijapur 
(2) 
Chitradurga 
(3) 
Chikballapur* 
(4) 
Mysore 
(5) 
Udupi# 
(6) 
Land use change 
(1976 - 2005) 
Increase in net 
sown area 
Increase in 
agricultural 
land, Decrease 
in forest land 
and pasture 
Decrease in 
pasture and 
fallow 
Increase in net 
sown area and 
fallow. 
Decrease in 
pasture 
Marginal 
increase in net 
sown area 
Most common 
crops (1985) 
Jowar, oilseeds, 
pulses, bajra 
Oilseeds, jowar, 
pulses, bajra 
Pulses, 
oilseeds, paddy, 
maize 
Pulses, jowar, 
oilseeds, paddy 
Not available 
Most common 
crops (1995) 
Jowar, oilseeds, 
bajra, pulses 
Oilseeds, ragi, 
jowar, pulses 
Oilseeds, ragi, 
coconut, pulses 
Paddy, ragi, 
pulses, cotton 
Paddy, fruits, 
coconut, pulses 
Most common 
crops (2006) 
Oilseeds, 
pulses, jowar, 
sugarcane 
Oilseeds, 
coconut, maize, 
onion 
Oilseeds, 
maize, fruits, 
eucalyptus 
Pulses, paddy, 
tobacco, 
sugarcane 
Paddy, fruits, 
coconut, 
arecanut 
Source: Reports for various years of Directorate of Economic and Statistics, Government of Karnataka. 
*Data for erstwhile district of Kolar. 
# Data available only from 1998 when it was formed as a new district. 
 
Purushothaman and Kashyap (2010) and Purushothaman et al. (2012a) provide 
insights on commercialisation of agriculture that ignored the socio-ecological aspects 
during the liberalisation period. 
 
 
VI 
 
METHODS 
  
The study adopted a systematic inclusive process to assess the impact of KSPOF, 
using Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) separately with farmers, NGO staff and 
department executives responsible for policy implementation in each of the selected 
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14 villages.11 Annexure 1 provides the set of questions deliberated in FGDs. Field 
walks with randomly selected small farmers and mapping of policies (other policies 
that have similar or contradictory impact) as well as institutions [formal (research, 
executive and outreach agencies) and informal (collectives)] preceded the FGDs.  
Considering the short span of three years since the policy was implemented, we 
focus on two parameters (viz., awareness and continuity) of impact along with 
indicators like completeness in implementation, efficacy of staff involved as also 
factors like collective action and homogeneity; to reflect on the impact of the 
mechanisms that implemented KSPOF on the ground. Ideally, the impact of such a 
policy should be adjudged also by the changes in soil productivity and the welfare of 
farm families in the longer run (short to medium term impacts on these are analysed 
in Purushothaman et al., 2012 b, c and Patil et al., 2012). The two parameters/criteria 
(degree of awareness and probability of continuing with organic farming) were 
derived from discussions with farmers, NGOs, and Agricultural Officers (AO) 
specific to the 14 selected villages. While the first parameter (awareness levels) can 
directly be traced to the work of the NGO and agricultural officers, the second one 
(continuity of organic practices after the NGOs exit and subsidies stop) is subject to 
many other contingent conditions, like availability of inputs and suitable planting 
materials. Both are nevertheless affected by governance strategies and mechanisms - 
in the design of support, rapport of NGOs with farmer communities, efficiency of 
executive officials and the department (in timely release of incentives avoiding high 
transaction costs for farmers). 
 Other more generic symptoms of good governance, not specific to the selected 
policy (like timely release and utilisation of funds from higher offices in the line 
agency) are out of scope of this study and focus is only on the impact of governance 
mechanism at the grassroots on the stated policy goals. The next section presents the 
results of FGDs conducted (method described in Section VI) in the selected villages 
(selection described in Section V) with this objective.  
 
VII 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Conventional agricultural governance at the grassroots has been through 
extension agencies that are geared for spreading experimental results through 
programmes like ‘lab to land’. This reflects the conventional wisdom in agricultural 
policies that whether it is technology development, education, research or extension, 
completely new and sophisticated techniques are necessary. Such tools often 
originating from very different socio-ecological contexts, trigger treadmills of 
technology dependence (for instance, crops from new technologies in need of 
technology intensive inputs and practices, in-turn depend on more technology). 
Needless to say these have been mostly of help to large and resourceful land holders 
(Suri, 2006). It appears that the education, research and extension systems in Indian 
agriculture are inclined and geared towards foreign ideas, technology and curriculum. 
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This predicament, one could argue, is partially responsible for the mismatch between 
the requirements of large chunk of small farm holdings (that are unique to the 
country) and the major investments that happened in policies, research and education.  
KSPOF in this context is a deviation from the mainstream. We have assessed six 
indicators (or factors) of governance of this policy (Table 3). Potential continuity and 
improvement of indigenous practices envisaged by this policy and awareness 
generated during its implementation are assessed from farmers’ responses to 
concerned queries during FGDs in selected villages. To evaluate the extent of 
implementation of the policy, we took the number of schemes under the policy that 
were implemented in the concerned village from one stakeholder group (of the three 
stakeholder groups and FGDs in each village), which was cross verified with the 
other two groups. NGO efficiency was evaluated from the response of farmers and 
AOs and supplemented by our observations on the actual outcomes of their expected 
roles. Similarly efficiency of the AOs was assessed based on statements from the 
other two groups. Collective action, in terms of group activities like self-help groups, 
co-operatives and cultural programmes; a factor that was influencing the policy 
outcome (in terms of spread of practices and evolution of technologies) was verified 
both with farmers and NGOs. Homogeneity, another contributing factor as identified 
in the policy (albeit outside the purview of policy implementation) was measured in 
terms of caste diversity12 in the village.  
 
TABLE 3. GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND IMPACT OF KSPOF 
 
  Continuity Awareness Policy  Department   
  of organic among implemen- NGO officials’ Collective Homogeneity 
District Village practices farmers tation efficacy efficacy action (castes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Bijapur 1 + +++ ++ +++ - - - 
 2 +++ +++ ++ +++ ++ ++ + 
 3 + +++ ++ ++ - - - 
Chitradurga 1 +++ +++ ++ ++ ++ ++ - 
 2 + ++ + ++ ++ - - - 
 3 +++ ++ ++ +++ ++ + +++ 
Chikballapur 1 - + - + + + - 
 2 - + + + - + - - 
 3 + + + +++ + + - 
Mysore 1 + + - + + + + 
 2 ++ + + +++ + + +++ 
 3 - - + + - + - 
Udipi 1 +++ ++ + ++ ++ + - 
 2 + + - + - + - 
Improvement / Better: + = 20 per cent or less , ++ = 21 per cent to 74 per cent, +++ = 75 per cent or more.  
Decline / Deficient: - = 20 per cent or less, - - = 21 per cent to 74 per cent, - - - = 75 per cent or more. 
 
FGDs with NGOs, AOs and farmers who were partaking in the implementation 
of the policy, imply that a reasonable level of awareness has been raised across all 
implemented villages, though outside the group of participating farmers and outside 
selected villages, the level of awareness varied. As far as the major question of 
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continuity is concerned, only farmers from four out of 14 selected study villages 
declared that organic farming practices will be continued, seven villages were unsure 
and three villages were clear about discontinuing the practices after NGOs leave and 
subsidies stop (Table 3). The three villages where FGDs revealed possible 
discontinuation of organic practices once the external support ceases, were also the 
places (among the study sites) where the factors affecting policy outcome were not 
performing well (Table 3). All these three villages fall in districts closer to the city of 
Bangalore than the other study districts and FGDs also reveal that continuity of the 
practice is influenced by institutional and governance factors as much as by 
proximity to urban areas.  
In spreading awareness about organic farming policy, NGOs and AOs were most 
successful in four villages, somewhat successful in two and just imparted minimal 
awareness in six villages. In rest of the two villages, even bare knowledge of the 
policy was doubtful. With respect to the implementation of the policy in its full form 
(in terms of declared schemes to be implemented), only five villages received all the 
schemes while another set of five villages saw some schemes implemented and in 
four villages none of the schemes were implemented well. NGOs were adjudged 
efficient in performing their roles in five villages, average in three and of minimal 
presence in six villages. Agricultural officers (AOs) were somewhat effective in 
spreading information about the schemes available under the policy in four villages 
and in the rest, were not up to the expected levels. In 11 villages, collective activities 
around agriculture and other developmental schemes were prominent but the 
remaining three villages lacked cohesion required for group actions, while most of 
the villages (10 out of 14) were caste heterogeneous.  
Factors like awareness among farmers about schemes, degree of implementation, 
efficient functioning of NGOs and department officials’ effectiveness were very 
important for a possible self organisation of farmers to continue the new practices 
without external support. Collective activities and caste homogeneity apparently have 
not influenced this potential. Though collective activities and homogeneity appeared 
to be less significant in determining the continuation of organic farming, the villages 
where collective action was observed showed potential for continuity. The lowest 
potential for continuity was observed in districts where department officials were not 
effective – in terms of continued availability in their office and in the village; as well 
as due to many posts lying unfilled. This probably indicates that NGO efficacy can 
only facilitate, but not substitute governance by the executive agency. The following 
section discusses the results in detail with a focus on small scale farmers.  
 
Small Farmers and NRM  
 
FGDs revealed that while traditional know-how and practices in organic farming 
are almost extinct, formal rules for organic practices show signs of potential 
emergence as innovative and resourceful strategies in the policy guidelines. Thus, 
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these practices now getting popular are not a ‘going back to old times’ as traditions 
vary from place to place (e.g., farmers in hilly areas tend to practice organic farming 
even without special incentives) and from crop to crop (e.g., there are crops that 
farmers apply more organic manure – areca and certain varieties of grapes) as also 
due to the fact that alternate farming traditions have been evolving over time, albeit in 
pockets – natural farming, bio-dynamic farming and Low External Input Sustainable 
Agriculture (LEISA) are examples. Out of the new farming traditions LEISA is more 
popular among small farms while the other two are generally practiced by large land 
holders, growing high value crops like coffee.  
NGOs implementing the policy found that the small farmers want to emulate 
large holders in the selection of crops (that mainly target markets) while struggling to 
ensure food and nutrition for the family. There were also informal norms emerging in 
tune with the institutionalised and most prevalent chemically intensive practices. 
These include setting aside some crop area under organic practices for the family’s 
own consumption, resonating the idea of ‘inputs from markets to raise products for 
the market’, raised during FGDs in study villages. Most farmers refer to the inputs 
procured from market as “english manure/ medicine” as against “local manure”. 
Unlike the other two groups (NGOs and AOs); farmers do not confine the 
discussions (in FGDs) to just the policy under study but tend to link related and 
similar policies from the same or other departments. They also link policies to 
changes that had taken place in the land use and cropping pattern in their villages. 
They apparently kept track of the efficacy of governance as revealed by discussions 
on policies that are locally considered best in terms of implementation. Farmer FGDs 
appreciated the governance mechanism involving local NGOs in implementation, 
relatively transparent process and the focus on small farmers. Most FGDs also 
highlighted why it is more important for the small holder (than large/corporate farms) 
to adopt organic practices considering the possible reduction in costs and financial 
risks;13 as well as readiness, availability and sufficiency of family labour for the small 
land area especially in the background of the high proportion of expenses incurred on 
food and nutritional requirements. Although they recognise the schemes under 
KSPOF as having helped raise crop yield and reduce cost of production, concerns 
were raised about the availability of farm yard manure due to shrinking livestock 
numbers and available biomass in and around their field. The policy provisions to 
support livestock keeping, azolla culture and composting so as to augment manures 
produced in-situ have been benefitted by the governance and institutional 
mechanisms put in place involving active NGOs and farmers.  
The integrated approach of the policy involving many interlinked agencies 
working together towards a common goal instead of forming a new establishment 
takes cue from the ‘form following functions’ rule (Schroeder et al., 2008) that also 
expects unintended consequences arising from institutional interplay. The unintended 
consequence in some regions where KSPOF has been implemented was reported as 
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substitution of food crops with commercial crops (Patil et al., 2012), potentially 
impacting the household food and financial security.  
Urban expansion can change cropping pattern to cater to the demand of high 
income population in the city. These exotic crops generally need intensive use of 
external inputs. But if institutional and governance factors work well, even transition 
to new crops could be made less damaging to the small holder – in terms of suitably 
modified organic practices. 
 
VIII 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Notable awareness on NRM issues among farmers across villages where the 
selected policy was being implemented is a clear pointer to the potential of joint 
involvement of diverse institutions when dealing with the socio-ecological issues of 
rural India. Our results also indicate that institutional efforts in promoting sustainable 
agricultural practices were relatively more effective in less developed districts. 
Efficacy of the executive arm of the government as well as completeness in the 
implementation of all schematic components emerge crucial in spreading NRM for 
sustaining small farms. Very few agencies involved in manufacturing and dealing in 
chemical fertilisers were identified to be negatively impacted with the policies aiming 
at sustainability of agriculture. 
The methodological approach of the paper though tailored to the intention of 
identifying institutional gaps (in terms of governance) and failures (e.g., in terms of 
conflicting policies) demands contextual design of actual tools to be used in the field; 
also echoed in Das (2007) in a related but distinctly different context of certified 
organic farming in India. Extensive primary and secondary data collection for a 
multidimensional impact assessment (Purushothaman et al., 2012a,b) prior to the 
FGDs provided us with the required understanding to design this tool for the context.  
The idea that ‘the people have to be seen as being actively involved in shaping 
their own destiny, and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of top-down 
development programmes’ (Sen, 2000) is apparently reinforced in the paper. From 
this perspective, the most far-reaching aim of development is an increase in the social 
agency of a particular social group. This so-far invisible goal of policy 
implementation has been highlighted in other studies where farmers apparently 
prioritise not just the economic aspects, but also health, occupational satisfaction, 
social activities and water resources (Purushothaman et al., 2012b). Thus inclusive 
design and participatory governance emerge crucial in agricultural NRM for 
sustaining small farms in terms of livelihood and ecological outcomes as well as 
social acceptance. 
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NOTES 
 
1. http://tribal.nic.in/writereaddata/mainlinkfile/File1033.pdf accessed on 4th June 2012. 
2. http://www.greentribunal.in/downloads/NGT-fin.pdf accessed on 5th June 2012. 
3. http://leisaindia.org/. 
4. According to Gulati and Narayanan (2000), relative share of farmers and industries in the central government 
fertilizer subsidy changes over time. Last two decades show increasing share of the industries. 
5. In 2004, National Project on Organic Farming (NPOF, by Task Force on Organic Farming supported for 
capital investment by NABARD) received INR 57.05 crore while subsidy for chemical fertilisers was INR 10, 616 
crore; in 2008-09 the allocation for NPOF was INR 164 crore, while subsidy for chemical fertilisers was INR 75, 849 
crore. (Sources: Organic Farming Policy 2005, Ministry of Agri. Department of Agriculture and Cooperation 
(Memorandum for Expenditure Finance Committee on NPOF, Fertiliser Association of India - Annual Reports).  
6. http://www.kar.nic.in/finance/bud2010/budhig10e.pdf and Karnataka State Annual Budget 2011-12 
7. Allocation for KSPOF continued from 2006 to 2010, and from then on was subsumed under the allocation for 
the organic farming mission. 
8. http://raitamitra.kar.nic.in/kda_booklet.pdf 
9. The policy is said to have originated from discussions that the then State Minister of Agriculture held with 
farmers in distressed taluks of Karnataka and was drafted by a visionary secretary in the department. 
10. The selection was (as in Purushothaman et al., 2012b) based on an iterative and participatory analysis of 
change in land use, cropping pattern and farmers’ suicides in all districts of the state as well as considering agro-
climatic diversity, and the need to have control areas for the criteria considered in temporal analysis. Three taluks in 
each of the five selected districts (except in the case of Udupi, where only two taluks were chosen given its relatively 
small size) were chosen following the same procedure that was adopted for districts. 
11. Groups of farmers had 10-15 individuals while NGO representatives were 3-4 and department officials 
generally 2, in each village. 
12. Considering the fact that cast is a major identity in rural Karnataka, the number of castes constituting 20 per 
cent or more of the households in the village, denotes heterogeneity in the village. 
13. The financial impacts in the short, medium and long run (Patil et al., 2012, Purushothaman et al., 2012 b, c 
and d) for farmers involved in this policy have shown insignificant reduction in crop yield (often no reduction in 
yields too) and considerable cost reduction. This supports Nadkarni’s (1988) argument while questioning the 
assumption that sufficient manure cannot be produced on-farm to meet crop requirement as the basis of expecting 
yield reduction in transition. Yield reduction is a possibility if same varieties grown with synthetic inputs are grown 
in the same soil without adequate organic manure and other practices to recover soil. Also, yield reduction has been 
universally observed where inorganic inputs have been used continuously and intensively.  
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ANNEXURE 1 
 
CHECKLIST USED IN FGDS 
 
1) Group interactions with farmers:  
  1. Trends in conflicts:  
    i. Village level (driven by caste, alcohol, property, politics, gender)  
    ii. Household level (driven by alcohol, property)  
  2. Incidence of conflicts / violence – number under each category for the past one year  
    i. Village level (driven by caste, alcohol, property, politics, gender)  
    ii. Household level (alcohol, property)  
  3. Collective actions:  
    i. No: of SHGs (gender and purpose wise)  
      a. Extent of involvement (women and lower castes) in each  
     ii. No: of festivals (common to all the villagers and community specific) in the background 
of number of castes in the village  
  4. Disparity  
    i. Trend (in caste, income and assets)  
    ii. % of households (of two adults) with land > 5 acres  
    iii. % of households earning more than ` ---/ year  
  5. Perception on policies:  
    i. Schemes/ policies for rural poor  
    ii. Rank the above list in terms of effectiveness  
    iii. Schemes that help mainly the rich/ better off  
  6. Perception on institutional effectiveness: government department of agriculture, NGOs and 
collectives  
  7. Any other comments on KSPOF than those mentioned so far 
2) Interaction with officials in the Department of Agriculture and NGO functionaries:  
  1. Policies that help/helped rural poor  
  2. Rank the above list of effective policies  
  3. Policies that help mainly the rich/ better off  
  4. Factors that affect effectiveness and continuity of KSPoOF  
  5. Trends in conflicts:  
    i. Village level (driven by caste, alcohol, property, politics, gender)  
    ii. Household level (driven by alcohol, property)  
  6. Incidence of conflicts / violence – number under each category for the past one year  
    i. Village level (driven by caste, alcohol, property, politics, gender)  
    ii. Household level (driven by alcohol, property)  
Checklist was devised after informal interactions on specific questions about KSPOF. Interactions revealed that 
it was difficult to discuss just one policy with farmers and hence the list was modified to be more broad-based, but 
leading eventually to the particular parameters adopted to analyse implementation of KSPOF. 
